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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court is the proper court to hear this appeal 
from a Third District Probate Order declaring Ruth Elizabeth Ashton 
to be the only heir of the Estate of Kenneth Ashton (893900184ES) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court err in finding Ruth Elizabeth Ashton 
received a fee simple absolute as the sole heir of her husband's 
Estate when the Will provided: 
V 
I give, devise, and bequeath all of my property, 
real, personal, or mixed, of whatsoever nature and 
wherever situated, which I may own or have the right to 
dispose of at the time of my death to ray beloved wife, 
Ruth Elizabeth Ashton. She shall have the full enjoyment 
of the estate for as long as she desires or shall live. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Decedent and Thelma, his first wife, met Ruth Elizabeth Ashton 
in early 1980 (R138, page 9, line 17). After his first wife died 
(R137, page 6, line 17), Ken married Ruth on August 30, 1985. Ken 
and Ruth were married for three years, four months, and five days 
(R135, page 11, line 8) until, on January 5, 1989, after a short 
illness, Ken committed suicide (R138, page 19, lines 7ff). 
Mr. Ashton died owning probate assets worth $38,002.85 and 
non-probate assets of $163,297.30 (R138, page 45, line 12ff; R 138, 
exhibit 4; R89-94) . His probate was commenced by his son seven 
weeks after his father's death. The original probate requested 
that children be appointed Personal Representatives (R4-7). Ruth 
Ashton objected to the appointment of children as Personal Repre-
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sentatives because she was named in the Will and was preferred 
under the Utah statute (Rll-14). Ruth Ashton became the Personal 
Representative (R28-33), and the trial court (Judge Raymond Uno) 
found that Kenneth Ashton, through his Will, left his entire estate 
to his wife, Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, "free and absolute of the claim 
of any other heir." (R125) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
All of the evidence presented before this court was found by 
the District Court to result in a fee simple absolute estate in 
Ruth Ashton as the sole heir. At the trial court level, Appellants 
never submitted facts to be found by the District Court nor 
objected to any fact other than the ultimate legal conclusion of 
heirship. 
Appellants1 cases (cited in their current Brief) are distin-
guishable from the present case and set no legal precedent for the 
Utah courts to apply. These opinions represent eclectic, isolated 
views on the importance of supporting the trier of fact in its 
findings of fact and its interpretations of various testamentary 
language. 
Even if the Supreme Court of Utah wishes to express its 
opinion of the Testator's intent, a fee simple interest would be 
found in Respondent because it would be most favored, logical 
construction of the Will as a whole. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. A trier of fact properly has determined heirship from all 
evidence submitted. 
A. Questions of Fact 
Appellants state that the trial court erred by finding a fee 
simple interest when the language in the Will said, "for as long 
as she desires or shall live" (Brief, page 2, lines 1-5). Appel-
lants contend that this language is clear that "Ruth Ashton was 
given assets for life" (Brief, page 4, line 13). 
This trial court error is of fact or of law. The District 
Court judges, as triers of fact, have original jurisdiction in all 
matters not elsewhere provided by statute (Utah Constitution, 
Article VIII, Section 5). This extends jurisdiction to matters 
relating to the estates of decedents, including construction of 
wills and determinations of heirs and successors of decedents (UCA 
75-1-302 (l)(a)). Appellants have inferentially argued thait there 
was insufficient factual evidence for the Court's decision, 
(Brief, page 2, top), and directly argue that the trial court did 
not correctly find the facts of the Testator's intent which, 
therefore, would have led the Court to correctly find the life 
estate that was mandated by the Will's language, the Will's 
construction, or the testator's intent (Brief, pages 2-3, Bottom). 
The scope of the Supreme Court's appellate review is limited. 
The appellate court cannot act as a trial court and receive new 
evidence on the facts. The intent of the Testator was a factual 
issue and not the proper subject matter of appeal without a showing 
of clear error. For an appellate court to again consider what was 
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Testator's intent behind the Will's construction or his meaning of 
words is duplicative and not called for in light of Appellants' 
failure to show the District Court's decision was "clearly errone-
ous11 Inwood Labs vs. Ives Labs, 456 U.S. 844 (1982) . As was stated 
in Civil Procedure by Friedenthal: 
The reason for using the clearly erroneous standard is 
that the trial judge is thought to have an advantage over 
the appellate court because of his opportunity to view 
the witnesses; demeanor evidence is of course unavailable 
to the appellate court. In addition, the trial judge has 
been able to sift through the entire case and the 
ultimate judgment reached may reflect this familiarity 
which may provide much greater insight into the action 
than the limited view permitted on appeal of specific 
issues or rulings. 
The court found Ruth Elizabeth Ashton was the sole heir 
intended by Decedent to receive a fee simple absolute. The trial 
court judge found a fee simple interest after considering the Will, 
files, record memorandum, and evidence. He was within the scope 
of his discretion under 75-2-603 to do this. Also, Respondent 
believes this was a proper finding because the Will had only one 
operative section (Section V) with the other non-operative sections 
(VI and VII) being based upon the unfulfilled contingency of Ruth 
being dead at the time* Ken died. This finding should be affirmed 
unless a mistake of lciw was made. 
B. Questions of Law 
The fullest scope of r€>view, not surprisingly, is for errors 
of law; the appellate court will decide questions of law de novo. 
The Appellants' legal error claim is based on the following: 
(1) Mr. Ashton intentionally added this second 
sentence in Section V from earlier constructions (Brief, page 4, 
line 14) , 
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(2) an Alabama case held that "during her lifetime" 
meant a life estate, (Brief, page 4, line 5), 
(3) a California case involving a joint and mutual 
will using the language "for her use and benefit forever" found a 
life estate (Brief, page 4, bottom), 
(4) a New York case held "use" meant less than 
legal estate (Brief, page 5, line 2), 
(5) the construction of Ken's Will indicated his 
children were to be provided for (Brief, pages 5-8), and 
(6) a Georgia case considered interpreting the 
entire will as a whole (Brief, page 8, bottom) in order to give 
effect to a limitation. 
(1) The Intent of the Second Sentence. Appellants 
are correct that the second sentence was added to the final 
version. 
I give, devise, and bequeath all of my property, 
real, personal, or mixed, of whatsoever nature and 
wherever situated, which I may own or have the right to 
dispose of at the time of my death to my beloved wife, 
Ruth Elizabeth Ashton. 
But, significantly, the first sentence always has existed in 
every prior draft. It clearly grants Ruth an absolute fee inter-
est. Who, if anyone, does the second sentence restrict? Ruth is 
to have the full enjoyment of the estate (given by the first 
sentence) for as long as she desires or shall live. Impliedly, 
Ruth can fully enjoy the property (by selling it, consuming it, 
borrowing against it) . She can do this until she no longer desires 
it or until she no longer lives. 
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Also, having granted Ruth a fee interest by the first sen-
tence, what (if anything) is restricted? Ruth owns this property 
only until she gives it away or dies. The second sentence does not 
restrict this. If Ruth's alienation of property is restricted, who 
is benefited? There is no remainder over on her death. All of 
Ruth's property will pass under her will. 
The Court construed Section V and the Will as creating a fee 
simple interest not limited by this language. In other words, the 
Court found Ruth's fee simple interest would be fully enjoyed by 
her as long as she desired to so enjoy the property or as long as 
she lived to enjoy the property. No other subsequent interest 
existed. 
(2) The Alabama Case. In South vs. Yager 368 S2d 
863 (Ala., 1979), decedent bequeathed all his property to his wife 
"during her lifetime" even though there was no clear limitation 
over to remaindermen. The Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the 
trial court, finding that the will was unambiguous, and that the 
wife had requested for the testator to insert this language during 
her lifetime. 
Just as the Alabama Supreme Court supported it's trial court 
after pleadings, briefs, and depositions, the Supreme Court of Utah 
should support it's District Court decision of a fee simple. 
Unlike the Alabama case, after weighing the language giving Ruth 
the fee in the first sentence, and "the full enjoyment" in the 
second sentence, with all Court "files, records, memorandums, and 
evidence introduced at trial" (R26), the Court found a fee inter-
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est. This Finding of Fact should be supported on appeal for 
reasons given above. 
Appellants cite this Alabama case, which used the words 
"lifetime," as precedent in Utah for establishing a rule of will 
construction for omitted remaindermen. Appellants want the 
operative language to be "or shall live." Appellants want the Will 
interpreted that Ken's intent is clear (Brief, Page 4, line 19) to 
show a life estate for Ruth even though no remaindermen are named. 
Appellants are wrong on the case. The Alabama court itself 
said it would not apply rules of construction against the clearly 
expressed intention of the testator as found by the trial court 
(Infra at 864). 
Further, Appellants1 finding of clear intent of Ken is not 
borne out by the record. Mr. Ashton!s language for a life estate 
was not expressed clearly, nor was his intent to create a life 
estate expressed to others. In the deposition of the attorney 
drafting the Will, Carolyn Driscoll, she stated she did not believe 
the language was intended to create a life estate (R137, page 15, 
line 7ff). She reiterated that in her testimony in Court (R136, 
page 16, line 7, to page 20, line 5). 
Q. (Mr. Borsos) Did Mr. Ashton know the dif-
ference between the life estate and absolute 
grant in fee? 
A. (Carolyn Driscoll) I believe he did. (R136, 
page 17, lines 12-15) 
Q. Did Mr. Ashton in any of his communications to 
you indicate that he wanted a life estate in 
Ruth? 
A. No. (R136, page 20, lines 2-5) 
7 
The judge could have relied on this testimony to show Ken's 
unclear intent. According to the Will, Carolyn's responsibility 
was to make any "clarifications concerning the Will" (Will, Section 
XI, page 8, line 11). The judge could also have relied on the 
indefinite language of "full enjoyment" and "desires and lives" to 
find that a life estate was not clearly intended. 
(3) The California case. In re Cooper 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 740 (Calif., 1969), involved a husband and wife executing a 
joint and mutual will which provided that property went to the 
survivor "for his or her own use and benefit forever" and then on 
the survivor's death to named people. Husband and wife also 
covenanted not to revoke the will. The husband died and the wife 
claimed a life estate. However, the husband's probate court 
distribution decree appeared to grant an absolute interest and not 
a life estate. 
The California inheritance tax people again wanted to tax the 
named people in the wife's estate, but this time as though the wife 
owned a fee interest and all inheritance came from her and not the 
former husband. The appellate court found that, under California 
Inheritance Tax laws, the earlier husband's inheritance tax return 
with the wife claiming a life estate was proper. Thus, the second 
tax assessed under a life estate finding was proper. 
The trial court found that the husband's estate order dis-
tributing all property to the wife did not convey more than a life 
estate. The trial court agreed with the wife's executrix "on the 
ground Bessie Cooper had only a life estate in the assets" (at page 
8 
742) . The appellate court sustained the trial court and allowed 
the reduced tax assessment. 
The California case involved a joint will signed by the 
husband and wife, a will which was never changed after the hus-
band's death, a promise never to revoke the will, a claim by the 
wife that she was not more than a life tenant under the joint will, 
the payment of inheritance taxes as though the wife were a life 
tenant, and finally, the death of the wife without changing her 
will, leaving her property to the same remainderman named in the 
same joint and mutual will that had been declared in her husbandfs 
estate to grant her a life estate. 
In the present case, Ruth Ashton never has claimed a life 
estate. There was no joint or mutual will. Ruth has always 
claimed a fee interest. A probate court found she had a fee 
interest. No will provision nor contract prevented revocation of 
the survivor's will nor promised to maintain the will. No irrevoc-
able joint or mutual will provisions existed providing for alterna-
tive dispositions to the same beneficiaries on the death of both 
Ken and Ruth as required under Utah law (UCA 75-2-70). 
The California case interpreted final court probate orders for 
tax purposes holding (a) that trial court orders should be sus-
tained if facts for them exist and (b) that the will as a whole 
should be used to construe any particular language. Respondent 
agrees to both positions. 
(4) The New York case. In re. Brandsteinfs Estate 
150 NY S2d 911 (New York, 1956) defines the word "use" as a word 
of art "to mean life estate," but also the New York court found the 
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word "use" to mean occupancy of property (at 913) and stated, 
"However, this Testator's intention was to create a trust and not 
legal life estates" (at 912). 
Appellants1 analogy of this case to the present is unclear. 
Ken did not employ the word "use" in his Will. Ruth has the "full 
enjoyment of the estate for as long as she desires or shall live," 
and not mere "occupancy" (not full enjoyment) of a home or any 
other asset. Ken did not write the word "use." If the New York 
case found the word "use" to be words of limitcition, then do 
Appellants imply that, in the present case involving the words 
"full enjoyment," we are also limited because "use" means "full 
enjoyment"? Appellants do not say how the words "use" and "full 
enjoyment" are related. Finally, if Appellants are right that the 
word "use" is a word of art implying a less than legal estate, then 
did Ken's failure to employ that word of art create* a fee estate? 
Certainly it must create more than a life estate. 
(5) The structure of the Will. (Appellants' Brief, 
pages 5 and 6) indicates that only in Section V is there a disposi-
tive grant. Section VI begins with the words: "In the event that 
my wife, Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, shall die..."; and Section VII 
begins (page 4) "should my wife. . . predecease me or die at the same 
time." Both sections dealing with the contingency of Ruth's death 
had to have been found by the Trial Court to be inoperative or else 
someone else would have been found sharing the estate with Ruth. 
The Appellants stressed the fact that Decedent had a "detailed 
scheme to provide for his offspring" (Brief, page 7, line 2), and 
Ken also had the contingency that, if Ruth could not serve as 
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Personal Representative, joint alternate Personal Representatives 
from each family would stand on unequal footing, (eg. the one from 
Ken's family has a veto power over the other, Brief, page 7). 
Appellants cite no authority for any inference to be drawn from 
this anomaly. All these provisions are not effective if Ruth is 
alive. 
Appellants argue (Brief, page 9) that Ken "was concerned about 
his children being beneficiaries under his Will" and "this concern 
is incompatible with Ruth's fee interest" (Brief, page 9, line 2). 
But, there is no incompatibility between the contingent remainder 
to the children if Ruth were dead and the total grant to Ruth of 
everything if she lived. The trial court reviewed the whole Will 
and found a fee interest in Ruth. Respondent agrees with the trial 
court and finds this interpretation consistent with the structure 
of the Will. Ken loved his children, Ruth, and Ruth's children. 
He provided first for Ruth and gave her everything. But, if she 
were dead, Ken gave the most to his children and then to her 
children. 
Ken could have said that Sections VI and VII remainderman 
"take after Ruth's life estate," but he didn't say that. What he 
said was that Ruth gets "all of my property" in Section V, and if 
Ruth is dead, then property is to go according to Section VI and 
VII. Ruth is named Personal Representative alive, but if Ruth is 
dead or does not wish to serve then under Section X, other co-
Personal Representatives are to act unequally as instructed. The 
Trial Court would have been wrong to have ignored the contingency 
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at the beginning of each Section VI, VII, and X and found an intent 
to create a life estate from contingency provisions. 
(6) The Georgia case. Tucker vs. Black 315 S.E. 
2d 910 (Georgia, 1984) involved the testator's provision devising 
land to his wife and son for life and then "it shall go to the 
children of my said son." Yet testator in another section devised 
property to his wife and son "without limitation." The trial court 
held a life estate was created and the entire will needed to be 
constructed to reconcile this. The appeals court agreed. 
Respondent agrees that the whole Will needs to be considered, 
and for the reasons expressed in this Brief this would mean Ruth 
gets a fee interest. 
II • The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were not 
objected to by the Appellants. 
On November 22, 1989, Respondent's attorney sent Appellants' 
attorney the copy of the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. On December 1, 1989, Judge Raymond Uno signed the Findings 
of Fact and Order. On December 27, 1989, Appellants filed their 
Notice of Appeal. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 52 (6)) provide that 
within ten days from entry of judgment, the Findings of Fact may 
be entered. Appellants did not seek redress of deficiencies in the 
Findings or Conclusions of Law. Having not contested them earlier, 
they stand correct. They may be of little weight, but they are not 
irrelevant. Further, if Appellants wanted certain findings 
included in the order, the appropriate means to so would have been 
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by request to the trial court for inclusion of facts or for objec-
tion to the facts proposed. Appellants did neither. 
III. Legal construction of Will grants a fee simple interest. 
A. Most logical construction is of a fee interest: 
The grant of a fee interest in the first sentence of Section 
V is clear. The second sentence may have several interpretations. 
(1) First, it may be surplusage. The Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that subsequent testamentary expressions 
limiting a clearly granted estate must be equally clear. In re. 
Campbell's Estate, [27 UT 361, (1904) (quoted R114)], stated 
"Where the intention of the Testator in respect 
to the particular matter is clearly expressed 
by the terms of the will any subsequent expres-
sion of intent or by the Testator must, in 
order to limit the prior expression of inten-
tion, be equally clear and intelligible, and 
indicate an intention to that effect with 
reasonable certainty." 
Respondent knows of no case holding the words "full enjoyment" 
or "desire" as words of limitation. Perhaps the words "or shall 
live" could be words of limitation. The text and context of those 
words needs to be reviewed. 
In the context of the sentence or section, they appear 
predicatory and not required words of limitation. In the sentence, 
they form the disjunctive with "desires" modifying "full enjoy-
ment." This could be expressive, as Carolyn Driscoll claimed, of 
the intent not to create a life estate (R136, page 7, lines 12-15 
and lines 2-5). Similarly, the section could have been read to 
restate the obvious truth that Ruth, having gotten a fee interest 
from the first sentence, now fully enjoys it for as long as she 
desires or for as long as she lives. 
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What happens when Ruth dies? Mr. Ashton doesn't tell us in 
Section V. Appellants claim Sections VI and VII tell us what 
happens. Respondent believes these sections do not operate if Ruth 
is alive at Kenfs death, and they certainly could not pass Ruth's 
property at her death. Her will would do that. 
(2) Second, these words "or shall live" do not 
delimit a traditional life estate. Even if Appellants are right 
that the language means Ruth enjoys the property for life, she 
fully enjoys the property. Full enjoyment is more than "use" (as 
is explained supra). Ruth has everything (i.e. "all") by the first 
sentence and "full enjoyment" by the second. If "or shall live" 
are words of limitation, does this mean Ruth can fully enjoy not 
just income but capital gains? Can she fully enjoy the homes for 
life and commit waste? Can she fully enjoy the property and make 
imprudent investments? Can she remarry and fully use the property 
to support herself and others? 
Respondent thinks so. Decedent left no explicit instructions 
to the contrary and, in fact, repeatedly indicated he wanted his 
wife well cared for by non-probate transfers. (Consider that, 
aside from this Will cind the first sentence of Section V, the bulk 
of the assets passed outside of probate directly to his wife 
through insurance and employment benefits) (R138, Exhibit 4, R89) 
(R135, page 38, line 24ff). 
(3) Third, Appellants' cases cited in their Brief 
(and discussed by Respondent, infra, page 5ff) describe far 
different life estates than Ken's. The Alabama case involved a 
clear, unambiguous expression of a life interest (i.e. "during a 
14 
lifetime") which had been inserted in the husbandfs will at the 
request of his wife- The California case involved an irrevocable 
joint and mutual will specifying a life estate followed by an 
irrevocable remainder interest- There the wife actually claimed 
a life estate in her husband's estate. The New York case defined 
"use" as a word of art creating a life estate whenever it was 
employed. The Georgia case gave a life estate and remainder in one 
section and a fee in another section. 
(4) If Ruth gets a life estate, who gets the 
remainder? According to Section VI, those surviving children of 
Ken get 9 3 percent (which percentage is periodically adjusted 
downward by "Addendum Number 1") and those surviving children of 
Ruth get 7 percent (upward adjusted). Based on Decedent's formula 
(R138, page 25, line 13ff, exhibits 2 and 3), Ruth's testimony was 
that these computations by Ken were based on optimistic and 
conservative estimates to create family harmony (R138, page 30, 
lines 2-20). 
Appellants claimed Ken's "taking care of his children was a 
major concern" (Brief, page 8, lines 9 and 10) to him, and this 
implied Ruth was to get a life estate. However, even under 
Appellants' view, Ken's Will does not take care of all his chil-
dren—only those children who survive Ruth. 
The remainder (if it is a remainder) is not an absolutely 
vested remainder. The Will makes the remainder contingent, because 
the remaindermen do not enjoy their interest whenever and however 
the prior estate terminates. Rather, they would take (if they 
survive Ruth and Ken) whatever percentage interest existed at the 
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moment of their father's decith. But suppose at Kenfs death Ruth 
gets only a life estate followed by a remainder to the children. 
The remainder is still not vested. In other words, the children's 
interest (if it is a remainder) is not determined until after Ken's 
and Ruth's deaths when both the percentages of the children's 
participation (see Amendment No. 1) and the survival (of which 
children) is determined. If all children died before Ruth, then 
an intestacy has occurred, because there are no surviving heirs of 
Ken. If all Ken's children or Ruth's children die, then there is 
an intestacy of that class. 
In construing the language of a will, an interpretation which 
will prevent a partial intestacy is desirable. For that reason, 
cases cited in a North Carolina Law Review Article (12 North 
Carolina Law Review 324) (R110-111), resulted in a finding of a 
fee interest even though the language indicates a life estate. For 
example, the language, Mto her heirs and assigns for her lifetime," 
"to be used by her so long as she lives and enjoys the same," "to 
be in fee simple for life," "to be for h€>r lifetime, to manage and 
dispose of as she may see cause," all created fee interests. 
B. A fee simple absolute interest is the most favored 
legal construction for this kind of "full enjoyment" life estate 
(if a life estate is found to have been intended by Ken). 
(1) A life estate: Kern granted a fee in one 
sentence and, under Appellants' view, in the second sentence 
restricted it to Ruth's full enjoyment during her desires and her 
lifetime. If this is a life estate, Ruth has the "full enjoyment" 
of the estate. In Simes on Future Interest, Section 893 (R117), 
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Simes discusses this situation by giving three possible construc-
tions to the language (e.g., "fully enjoy11): 
(a) Find a fee simple was intended if the will 
does not specify the estate granted and gives an unrestricted, 
express power to dispose of the fee. 
(b) Find a life estate was meant if the will 
stated only a life estate being given and treat the "fee" language 
as mere surplusage. 
(c) Find a fee simple interest (even if life 
estate language exists) because the additional language gave the 
power to dispose of the fee and this is what the testator wanted. 
Simes prefers the last construction of life estates to give 
effect to all the language. In our case, if Appellants1 view is 
correct and the "full enjoyment" granted by the second sentence 
and the full fee grant of the first are mere surplusage and add 
nothing to the gift of the life estate, then "it's difficult to see 
why it was inserted." Therefore, a construction to the effect that 
the power involves an interest more extensive than the life estate 
should be presumed," (i.e., a fee simple absolute). 
Especially in our case, finding a fee construction invests 
Ruth with immediate control, prevents intestacy, and gives effect 
to 99 percent of the words in Section V of the Will, making the 
contingent sections consistent on the alternative disposition if 
Ruth had died before Ken. 
(2) An Executory Interest. This estate may be 
granting a fee in Ruth with an executory interest over to the 
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children which springs into use when the elapsed time has occurred 
and whenever and however the prior estate terminates. 
Appellants make this argument (Brief, pages 9-10) inferen-
tially by claiming that Ruth has a life estate and then, on her 
death, (depending when it is) those children who survive her will 
take certain percentages (depending on which year they inherit). 
Before her death, Ruth could have the power to "fully enjoy" (i.e. 
consume) , but she doesn't have the power to will the property away. 
Under this interpretation, how could the childrenfs interests 
be evaluated with certainty? Disregarding the issue of whether 
Ruth has the power to change her will (which is the subject of 
another lawsuit, Ashton vs. Ashton, Civil No. 89090456, Third 
District Court, Judge Riqtrup, and which may come before this Court 
at a subsequent time), the executory interest in certain children 
may be so remote that the trial court was justified in finding a 
fee in Ruth. Certainly, if all of the children were dead, one 
Court has found that this ripened the life estate of the wife into 
a fee [Chambers vs. Shaw, 12 NW 223, 225 (Michigan, 1985)] where 
testator granted to the wife for her life and then to "heirs of my 
body" and the testator's only son died without issue*. 
(3) Similar constructions could have been made of 
this estate: 
(a) A life estate in Ruth and contingent 
remainder to those children surviving Ruth in varying percentages 
(depending on when Ruth died) with alternative remainder to heirs 
of Ken or Ruth if the children did not survive. (This is the 
children's position.) 
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(b) A life estate in Ruth with power in her 
to consume the entire estate and then contingent remainder to the 
children as in (a). 
(c) A determinable fee in Ruth subject to 
divestment upon her death (if she left property from Ken's estate) . 
(d) An absolute fee in Ruth with contingent 
alternative fee dispositions (if Ruth had not survived Ken) to the 
children (Respondent's position,) 
Ken could have helped with finding any of the foregoing. His 
failure to expressly limit Ruth's estate by remainders ov€*r causes 
confusion. The trial court was within the ambit of its authority 
to recognize this and find a fee in Ruth. For the Supreme Court 
to re-write Ken's Will would be very improper. 
C. Utah law favors reading a will as unambiguous. 
Under the Will, Ruth was granted certain unrestricted enjoy-
ment in Section V. No one else is granted that immediate enjoy-
ment. Others must first survive for a certain number of years and 
also survive Ruth and each other to enjoy their portion of the 
contingent share. There is not ambiguity, as the trial court 
found, if the Will views the grant to the children as contingent 
and the grant to Ruth as absolute. 
As quoted infra, In re. Campbell's Estate requires that, if 
a clearly expressed intention is found in one place, then this can 
only be limited by a clearly expressed limitation elsewhere. Ken's 
Will does not state a limitation of a clearly vested remainder. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants claim the Will on its face is clear in granting 
Ruth only a life estate (Brief, page 12, line 1) or, if the factual 
situation is looked at, a life estate determination is necessary 
to have the Testator's concern "more clearly met." 
Appellants have lost their mother and father and view the Will 
as an expression of their father's love for them. But the Will is 
also an expression of Ken's love for Ruth, Under Appellants' view, 
Ruth at least receives the full enjoyment of the property, while 
Ken's and Ruth's children are only contingently provided for in 
subsequent sections of the Will. Just a legal interpretation of 
the language of the Will would give Ruth a fee simple absolute. 
But such an interpretation is consistent with the testimony and 
background. Clearly Ruth is to be favored by the Will and in all 
inheritance. Only after her death are percentages to be adjusted 
between Ken's children and Ruth's children. These "remainders" 
could be thought of as the trial court might have, as divesting or 
limiting Ruth, but only as settling Ruth's and Ken's family 
disputes if both were to die together or close together. 
This Court should sustain the trial court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law when no error of finding is alleged and 
there exists valid rationale for having made a decision within the 
ambit of authority. 
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The foregoing Respondent's Brief is FILED and DATED this /3_ 
day of April, 1990. 
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